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Automatic Derivation of the Irrationality of e
MICHAEL BEESON†
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, San Jose State University, U.S.A.
As part of a project on automatic generation of proofs involving both logic and com-
putation, we have automatically generated a proof of the irrationality of e. The proof
involves inequalities, bounds on infinite series, type distinctions (between real numbers
and natural numbers), a subproof by mathematical induction, and significant math-
ematical steps, including correct simplification of expressions involving factorials and
summing an infinite geometrical series. Metavariables are instantiated by inference rules
embodying mathematical knowledge, rather than only by unification. The proof is gen-
erated completely automatically, without any interactive component.
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1. Introduction
The irrationality of e can be stated as q > 0 → |p/q − e| > 0, where p and q are
variables over natural numbers. This theorem was first proved by Euler in 1737. It has
now been proved by a machine (or, more accurately, by a program). To prove this theorem
automatically, the program must start with a slightly different form of the goal: q > 0→
∃C(|p/q−e| ≥ C/q! > 0). Without the existential variable C, the program cannot begin.
Without the denominator q! it also cannot succeed. But given this form of the theorem,
it does proceed completely automatically to find a proof. (The denominator q! gives it
the “hint” to multiply by q!.) The proof it finds is similar to the usual proof (see, for
example, Siegel, 1949, Chapter I) but employs a slightly different estimate to bound a
certain infinite series. A certain inequality involving factorials is needed in the course of
the proof; the program finds a proof of this inequality by mathematical induction. The
inductive proof requires some not-quite-straightforward algebraic manipulations to make
use of the induction hypothesis; the program also finds these steps automatically. The
heart of the proof involves expressing a certain quantity (in this case expressed by an
infinite series) as a sum of two parts, one of which is an an integer and the other of which
can be shown to be between zero and one. It follows that the quantity is not zero, and
indeed can be estimated from below. This principle is a variation on the basic principle
that an integer known to be positive must be at least one.
The instantiation that the program finds for the variable C involves the denominator q.
A human mathematician can “refine the estimates” to find a constant B independent of
p and q (B = 1/2 will do) such that |p/q − e| > B/(q + 1)!. This is beyond the present
capacity of the program. (It is also not presented in books that present the proof of the
irrationality of e.)
This paper explains the rules of inference used by the prover, and then explains how
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the prover constructs this particular proof. An appendix contains the actual printout of
the proof as produced by the program. The reader wishing more information about the
program can consult Beeson (1998a), where the first results with this theorem-proving
program are described. Those results were automatically-generated epsilon–delta proofs
of continuity of specific functions. It was because of the application to epsilon–delta proofs
that the program was named Weierstrass, after one of the pioneers of the epsilon–delta
method. However, the name seems less appropriate now, as an expanded version of the
prover demonstrates its capabilities in number theory as well as analysis.
2. Context of this Research
Mathematics consists of logic and computation, interwoven in tapestries of proofs.
“Logic” is represented by the manipulation of phrases (or symbols) such as for all x, there
exists an x, implies, etc. “Computation” refers to chains of formulae progressing towards
an “answer”, such as one makes when evaluating an integral or solving an equation.
Typically computational steps move “forwards” (from the known facts further facts are
derived) and logical steps move “backwards” (from the goal towards the hypothesis, as
in it would suffice to prove). The mixture of logic and computation gives mathematics
a rich structure that has not yet been captured, either in the formal systems of logic,
or in computer programs. The computer program that produced the proof reported on
here demonstrates an approach to this problem. The general features of this approach
have been described in Beeson (1998a). The research involves two computer programs,
Mathpert and Weierstrass. The former has been reported elsewhere in detail (Beeson,
1989, 1995, 1996): it contains implementations of over 2000 mathematical operations,
together with logical apparatus to keep track of assumptions that may be required or
generated by those operations. Mathpert (as in “Math Expert”) uses these operations to
provide a computerized environment for learning algebra, trigonometry, and calculus.
The second program, Weierstrass, is built upon a simple backwards-Gentzen theorem
prover, described in Beeson (1991) (but re-implemented in C). To this logical backbone
has been added a set of control structures, or if you like, implementations of special
inference rules, to facilitate the proper control of logical and computational steps. These
control structures operate at the top level of Weierstrass, but the computational steps
themselves can use, in principle, anything that has been implemented in Mathpert, which
is all high-school algebra, trigonometry, and one-variable calculus including limits, dif-
ferentiation, and (textbook-style) integration, as well as many techniques for rewriting
inequalities, and a few advanced algorithms, such as the Coste–Roy algorithm (Coste
and Roy, 1988), based on Sturm’s theorem, for determining whether polynomials have
roots in given intervals. The implementations of these operations in Mathpert are logi-
cally correct, so that they can be used in Weierstrass without the risk of inconsistency
that would accompany the similar use of Mathematica, Maple, or Macsyma.† Simplifi-
cation in Mathpert interacts with the list of current assumptions; assumptions can be
used in simplification, and simplification can generate new assumptions. A more detailed
description of Weierstrass can be found in Beeson (1998a).
The driving idea of this research program is that finding mathematical proofs requires
†To assert that the implementations are logically correct is not to say that this logical correctness has
been proved. What we mean is simply that any failure of logical correctness would be a programming
error, which could be fixed without altering the program design.
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expert knowledge of hundreds of special inference rules. An inference rule typically en-
capsulates knowledge of how to prove theorems of a certain form or in a certain context.
For example, in Beeson (1998a) we gave special inference rules that are used for bounding
given quantities in terms of other quantities. These rules enabled Weierstrass to auto-
matically generate epsilon–delta proofs of the continuity of certain specific functions, but
they are not special-purpose rules—bounding or “estimating” expressions is a fundamen-
tal activity in analysis. Now, in this paper we offer further evidence for this view of the
nature of mathematics: we add to Weierstrass a few simple inference rules concerning
estimates for infinite series, and the principle that a positive quantity which is an integer
must be at least one. The underlying logic already possessed the ability to distinguish
variables of type integer and real. We also add mathematical induction and another
new inference rule to aid in controlling the transitivity law for inequalities. These few
inference rules, together with the elementary mathematics available from Mathpert, en-
able the general logical mechanism of Weierstrass to find a proof of the irrationality of
e, which is a non-trivial theorem, usually presented in an upper-division number theory
course.
There are at present some 15 mathematical inference rules in Weierstrass, in addition
to the logical (Gentzen) rules and mathematical induction. It is noteworthy that all
mathematical knowledge needed for the proof of the irrationality of e is embedded in
these rules and in the simplification laws implemented in Mathpert. That is, the input file
for this proof contains only the goal; no axioms special to this proof need to be provided.
This strategy of embodying mathematical knowledge in inference rules is the key to our
success: the inference rules can use mathematical knowledge to instantiate metavariables,
rather than relying on unification. Unification (even the more sophisticated versions of
it) is a very primitive way to instantiate a metavariable. It is hopelessly inadequate for
dealing with inequalities: try proving ∃x(0 < x < 1) by a unification-based algorithm.
Related work includes Analytica (Clarke and Zhao, 1992), which is a theorem-prover
linked to the computational facilities of Mathematica, but deals only with quantifier-free
proofs. This means also metavariable-free proofs; even though most of the work on the
irrationality of e is quantifier-free, the use of metavariables and control mechanisms for
instantiating them is crucial, so it will not be possible to reproduce this work in Analytica.
The prover Nqthm (Boyer and Moore, 1988) has proved some impressive theorems of
number theory, including the law of quadratic reciprocity, but like Analytica, works best
with free-variable proofs, and in particular, lacks the rules of inference introduced here,
so it cannot prove the irrationality of e.†
Some work on the verification in HOL of proofs involving computation is presented in
Harrison and Thery (1993), but this does not involve proof generation. Otter (McCune,
1990) can do some kinds of computation using rewrite rules and AC unification, but
these are nowhere near adequate for the kinds of simplification needed in this proof. The
strength of Otter lies in its proof-search capabilities. The rules of inference used here are
sophisticated enough that there is almost no searching involved in the proof. Each step
is either simplification (forward reasoning) or is an inference step dictated by the form
of the goal, which turns out to succeed.
A scheme for regarding computation as defining an equivalence relation on formulae
and defining deduction on the equivalence classes is set forth in Dowek et al. (1998). The
†Presumably one could add these rules to Nqthm. We are not speaking here of some limitation on all
possible extensions of Nqthm.
336 M. Beeson
prover discussed in this paper does not fit into this framework, since computations can
both use the assumptions and generate new ones.
3. Nature of the Proofs Produced by Weierstrass
To avoid confusion, some discussion of the nature and purpose of the proofs generated
by Weierstrass is necessary. Weierstrass produces (internally) a proof-object, which can
be displayed or saved in more than one form. The intention is to produce a proof that
can be read and checked for correctness by a human mathematician; the standard to
be met is “peer review”, just as for journal publication. The proof object produced
does not represent a completely formal proof in a specified formal system of the type
traditionally studied by logicians. It fails to meet this standard because some of the
steps are calculations carried out by algorithms, for example, factoring polynomials or
“simplifying”. One could, of course, easily specify a formal system allowing such steps,
and this is in essence what the code for Weierstrass does. But the steps labeled “simplify”
are hard to translate into traditional logical systems, because what seems to a human
mathematician a very simple “simplification” can be hard to prove in a traditional logical
system. This is part of the reason that no previous computer program has produced
such proofs: most such programs insist on producing formal proofs. If a machine to
produce humanly-readable proofs, simplification steps must be allowed. Then one has
three choices: (1) settle for computer-generated proofs whose correctness is judged by
human beings, as in Weierstrass; (2) supply, once and for all, a formal proof of the result
of each of the (1800 or so) possible simplification steps, e.g. a proof that x2 + 2xy+ y2 =
(x + y)2, and instantiate these proofs for each simplification actually used. This would
turn Weierstrass’ proofs into formal ones; (3) demand in addition that all algorithms
involved have their correctness proved within the system. This is a higher standard, which
Weierstrass cannot meet, and would not be met even by (2). Human mathematicians do
not meet standards (2) and (3) either, so it seems reasonable to demand of a machine
intended as a prototype “mathematician’s assistant” that it should meet the standards
required for journal publication, instead of a higher standard.
4. Inference Rules Used in Weierstrass
In this section we describe the new rules, and some variations on old rules, that have
been added to Weierstrass since the publication of Beeson (1998a). The discussion will
make it apparent that these rules are general in nature, rather than ad hoc, and that
they embody mathematical ideas and techniques that are intuitive and can be applied to
mathematical arguments in different areas. That is, they are not special to the example
of the irrationality of e. Of course, there are probably several hundred such rules encap-
sulating the mathematical knowledge of a beginning graduate student, and the selection
of these particular rules was motivated by the experiment of seeing what was required
for the irrationality of e.
4.1. types
Weierstrass accepts typed variables, as in ∀x : N(x ≥ 0). It also accepts type “judge-
ments” such as x : N as atomic formulae. The latter is necessary to support the “variable
type” of Feferman’s applicative theories (which are not used in the present example), and
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the former is very useful for efficient theorem-proving. The two are connected by means
of an inference rule that permits the inference of n : A (from no premises) when n is
a variable of type A. Type information for the atomic types (in this case, just N, Z,
and R) is immediately accessible in the (implemented) variable itself. Type information
for compound types (such as N → N or the types of Feferman’s theories) is kept in a
separate table.
An important feature of this prover is that simplification is applied to propositions
as well as to mathematical expressions. Propositions expressing type judgements are no
exception. For example, the type expression q!/n! : Z (which expresses that q!/n! is an
integer) reduces to n ≤ q. Another example of a type expression that occurs in the proof of
irrationality of e is p(q−1)! : Z. This will reduce to true if p : Z and (q−1)! : Z reduce to
true. The former will reduce to true since p is a variable of type N. The latter will reduce
to true if (q − 1)! : Z does, but this reduces to 1 ≤ q. However, since the assumptions
can also be used in simplification, if 0 < q is in the assumption list, Weierstrass is able to
use the type information that q is of type Z to reduce 1 ≤ q to true. Thus p(q − 1)! : Z
can be reduced to true by simplification alone. No logical inference is required. When
debugging this proof, this simplification failed at first, because until then, I had forgotten
to put the hypothesis q > 0 in the statement of the theorem.
Reducing type expressions involving series:
∑q
n q!/n! is an integer, and this also can
be deduced without inference rules, by simplification alone. To deduce this, we simplify
the expression q!/n! : Z; but to simplify this to true, we need the assumption n ≤ q.
In previous publications the technique has been described by which Mathpert makes
temporary assumptions while simplifying an expression such as an indexed sum or definite
integral, so that such assumptions are indeed available when required. This technique
is called the “binders” technique, since it applies when expressions involving variable-
binding operators are simplified.
Subtypes (type embedding) are supported by Weierstrass. For example, one can infer
a : Z from a : N. The system of atomic types includes N, Z, R, Q, and C, although
only N, Z, and R are involved in the irrationality of e. More complicated types, such as
function types or comprehension types, are not used in this example.
4.2. simplification of factorials and infinite series
Certain simplifications needed in the proof were not provided by calls to Mathpert
code, and new simplification rules were introduced in Weierstrass to meet these needs.
For example, the laws of the factorial function are not considered elementary enough
that Mathpert should use them when a student chooses “simplify”. I have in mind here
such laws as (n + 1)! = (n + 1)n! and the corresponding “factorial cancellation laws”,
such as (n+ 1)!/(n+ 1) = n! and (n+ 1)!/n! = (n+ 1). These laws need to be applied to
fractions that contain other factors in numerator and denominator, in an arbitrary order
(as with many simpler rules used in Mathpert). But for pedagogical considerations they
could just as well have been included with other more “algebraic” laws. An example of
their use is in verifying the inequality 2n! ≤ (n + 1)!, which simplifies to 2 ≤ n + 1 and
then to 1 ≤ n.
Another “simplification” needed in the proof is “recognizing” and summing an infinite
geometric series. Again, there are only pedagogical reasons why this step is not performed
by the “simplify” command of Mathpert, and so had to be added specially to Weierstrass.
On the other hand, it is essential in this example that e be expanded into an infinite
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series. Clearly we do not want to expand e into a series every time we see e in a problem;
it is done only as a last resort when we cannot get anywhere by other means.
4.3. lower bounds on infinite series
The only rule of this kind presently implemented in Weierstrass is this: to prove a series
is positive, prove its general term is positive. Specifically, this rule takes the following
form:
c ≤ k,Γ⇒ 0 < ak
Γ⇒ 0 <
∞∑
k=c
ak
There is a similar rule for finite series, and a similar rule for ≤ in place of strict inequality.
Of course one could also formulate a version of the rule in which the hypothesis requires
only that the general term be non-negative and at least one term is positive, but this is
not required in the example of the irrationality of e.
This rule could have been implemented just as well as a simplification rule (applying
to the inequality in the conclusion) as an inference rule. For that matter, it could have
been included as an axiom and treated as special to this proof; in that case the logical
mechanisms would have handled this type of inference.
4.4. upper bounds on infinite series
To bound a series from above, use the comparison test to estimate the series from
above by a series whose sum is known. The simplest form of this rule would take the
following form:
c ≤ k,Γ⇒ |ak| ≤ bk
Γ⇒
∞∑
k=c
ak ≤
∞∑
k=c
bk
However, this simple form of the rule would be useless. We want to use this principle, for
example, to prove that
∑∞
k=c an < 1, by finding a suitable comparison series whose sum
is less than one. Therefore this rule must be used in combination with the transitivity of
equality. Control of transitivity is a recurring theme in automated deduction, and here
is one contribution to it:
c ≤ k,Γ⇒ |ak| ≤ bk Γ⇒
∞∑
k=c
bk < d
Γ⇒
∞∑
k=c
ak ≤ d
This rule is much more interesting, since the question arises as to how, when trying to
apply this rule in reverse, the comparison series bk is to be determined. There is an even
more basic question: how can this rule be properly expressed? In the first version of the
rule, ak and bk are just some terms of the language containing the variable k. In the
second form, however, if b is to be determined, we would appear to need a variable b,
and that variable would have to be of type N→ R. The language of Weierstrass would
support such a formulation, but that would leave it to unification to find a series with a
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known upper bound. Even if higher-order unification were implemented in Weierstrass
it would not be helpful unless there was a list of axioms giving upper bounds on known
series.
Instead, this rule is included specifically for geometric series
∑∞
k=c bk. A geometric
series is constructed with ratio 1/2 and first term bc = ac. In the future, this can be
extended to other types of known-summable series. This seems to correspond fairly well
to our intuitive idea of a mathematician’s “bag of tricks” for bounding a series from
above.
A difficulty arises when we want to prove a strict inequality. Of course the rule works if
we replace ≤ by < in both premise and conclusion; but since, in the cases of interest, we
are using a comparison series with the same first term, we will not be able to establish a
strict inequality in the premise. The rule is of course not correct with < in the conclusion
and ≤ in the premise, but it is correct if we add the additional premise that the second
term of the series satisfies a strict inequality. This form of the rule has been put into the
program.
4.5. controlling transitivity
It is a constant struggle in automated deduction to permit all desired uses of transitivity
(of equality or inequality) while preventing infinite regress or combinatorial explosion.
Here is another rule along these lines. We call it the “transitivecancel” rule. (In this rule,
Av means A multiplied by v.)
Γ, A ≤ B ⇒ C = Av v : N Γ, A ≤ B ⇒ Bv ≤ D
Γ, A ≤ B ⇒ C ≤ D
In the implementation of this rule, unification is not sufficient to find v. Instead,
algebraic cancellation is applied to C/A for the various A occurring in inequalities in the
antecedent, until a cancellation is found producing a term v = C/A which is “obviously”
a non-negative integer (for example, a variable of type N, or a number, or a product
of integers). Without the restriction that v should be an integer, the rule is of course
still valid (if v is non-negative), but it led to fruitless lines of attack. As implemented,
then, only one new subgoal is generated, since the first two hypotheses will be verified
by simplification.
This rule is very useful in proofs by induction, where A ≤ B is the induction hypothesis
φ(n), and C ≤ D is the induction goal φ(n+1). If the induction variable n occurs linearly
in an exponent, then C/A may cancel, producing a quotient without n in the exponent, so
Bv ≤ D may be simple to prove. Such a situation occurs in the proof of the irrationality
of e, when proving an estimate on the terms of an infinite series by induction. A simple
example of its use would be in the proof by induction of 2n ≤ (n + 1)!. Here we try to
derive 2n ≤ (n + 1)! ⇒ 2n+1 ≤ (n + 1 + 1)!. Cancelling 2n+1/2n we find v = 2, so the
new goal is 2(n + 1)! ≤ (n + 1 + 1)!. Using factorial simplification as discussed above
this reduces to 2 ≤ (n + 1 + 1), which is easily verified. Indeed Weierstrass can prove
2n ≤ (n+ 1)! by induction in just this way.
4.6. mathematical induction
The principle of mathematical induction is easily added to almost any theorem-prover.
The delicate issues are the selection of an induction variable and the decision to try
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mathematical induction. Weierstrass has rather crude rules for both of these, but they
are sufficient for the estimates needed in the course of the proof of the irrationality of e.
The rule of induction in Weierstrass is as follows:
Γ⇒ φ(c), c ≤ n, φ(n),Γ⇒ φ(n+ 1)
c ≤ n,Γ⇒ φ(n)
where n does not occur in Γ or in c. That is, the basis case is n = c since c ≤ n is in the
assumption list. Here n is a variable of type N or Z.
This formulation of the rule implies an answer to the “delicate issues” mentioned above.
Namely, induction on n will not be tried unless there is an inequality of the form c ≤ n
in the assumption list, with n of type N or Z, and in that case, the first such n will be
selected as the induction variable.
The usual formulation without c ≤ n, namely
Γ⇒ φ(0) φ(n),Γ⇒ φ(n+ 1)
Γ⇒ φ(n)
is used in Weierstrass when there is exactly one variable of type N or Z in φ. However,
this plays no role in the proof of irrationality of e.
4.7. the Zbound rule
The logical, as opposed to mathematical, heart of the proof is the interplay between
the type Z and the type R. The simplest principle connecting these two types is the
principle that if n : Z and 0 < n then 1 ≤ n. That is, there are no integers between 0
and 1. A more quantitative formulation of this principle is the following rule,
m : Z 0 < α α < 1
min(α, 1− α) ≤ |m+ α|
which we call the “Zbound rule”. We have omitted to write the antecedent Γ since it is
the same in both the hypotheses and conclusion.
This rule is only useful once the quantity we are trying to bound below has been written
in the form m+α with m : Z. For this purpose there is a special simplification rule which
tries to write its input in that form. In particular, this rule will break an infinite series
into a finite sum and an infinite “tail” if it can be calculated (by simplification) that the
terms up to a certain point are integers. In the application to the irrationality of e, the
series has the form
∑∞
n=0 q!/n!, so the natural place to break the series is at n = q, since
for n ≤ q, we have q!/n! : Z.
Of interest for the future are various refinements of this rule. If one wants the program
to be able to “refine the estimates” as mentioned in the Introduction, one may wish to
consider rules such as
m : Z 0 < A ≤ α α ≤ B < 1
min(A, 1−B) ≤ |m+ α|
Here, in the application of the rule, A and B would usually be new metavariables,
with certain variables “forbidden” to their values, so that we would be searching, e.g. for
bounds independent of q. This rule has been implemented, but there are difficulties to be
overcome before such a rule can be made to work properly, and no such rule is currently
used.
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5. Points of Interest in the Proof of the Irrationality of e
In this section we go through the proof step-by-step, bringing out the points about the
proof that are of special interest for automated deduction, and showing how the inference
rules given above are used to find the proof.
The starting point is
∀p : N∀q : N(q > 0→ ∃C(|e− p/q| ≥ C/q! ∧ C > 0).
The logical apparatus strips off the quantifiers and assumes q > 0 (puts it in the
antecedent). The existential variable C becomes a metavariable which must eventually
be instantiated. Putting the clause C > 0 last saves us from a fruitless attempt to prove
the inequality with C = q, since C > 0 will unify with the hypothesis q > 0. We then
start to verify |e − p/q| ≥ C/q!. Here is where the “hint” given by the q! term is used:
the inequality simplifies by clearing the denominator. The prover is able to deduce the
side condition that q! > 0 since this inequality reduces to true. The q! is then multiplied
into the absolute value (for reasons discussed below), yielding the goal
|q!e− pq!/q| ≥ C.
Factorial simplification is then used to reduce q!/q to (q − 1)!. This is not as trivial
as it seems, since this simplification requires q > 0, so the assumptions must be used.
Next the prover expands e in an infinite series—but only after trying everything else!
(Since, as discussed above, expanding e in a series should be a last resort.) The form of
this expression, however, is such that nothing else in the repertoire generates a noticeable
false start. (One has to wonder, though, if that would still be true if Weierstrass contained
a couple of hundred widely-varied mathematical inference rules.) This leads to∣∣∣∣∣q!
∞∑
n=0
1/n!− p(q − 1)!
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ C.
Now it is a problem to get the q! multiplied into the series, since generally simpli-
fication will pull constants out of series, rather than push them in. This is, therefore,
not performed by the “simplify” operation of Mathpert. Perhaps it should be, on the
grounds that it is a good idea to multiply constants involving factorial into series whose
general term contains factorial; but at present, it is not done. The same applies to the
step mentioned above, of multiplying the q! term into the absolute value. Both these
steps are performed under the direct control of Weierstrass rather than by Mathpert’s
simplification. The general principle here seems to be that if you cannot get your theorem
proved by simplifying as usual, you probably should expand things that were contracted,
multiply in things that were factored out, etc. At any rate that is what Weierstrass does;
there is no fine-tuning about “multiply factorials into series that contain factorials”. It
is simply, if nothing else works, push constants into absolute values and series instead of
factoring them out. We arrive at∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
n=0
q!/n!− p(q − 1)!
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ C.
Now the prover starts to prepare for the eventual use of the Zbound rule, by breaking
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the sum into two parts, separating off the initial terms that it can see are integers:∣∣∣∣∣
q∑
n=0
q!/n! +
∞∑
n=q+1
q!/n!− p(q − 1)!
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ C.
Since simplification is able to simplify the type expression that says the finite sum is
of type Z to true, the Zbound rule is now applied, writing this inequality in the form
|m + α| > C, where m = ∑qn=0 q!/n! − p(q − 1)! and α = ∑∞n=q+1 q!/n!. This unifies
the metavariable C with min(α, 1− α). (Of course, the prover does not introduce a new
letter α and a definition as we do here for convenience and legibility.) It remains to verify
0 < α and α < 1. 0 < α is easily verified, since the general term of the series is positive.
The hard part is α < 1.
The prover attacks α < 1 using the comparison test. The proof presented in Siegel
(1949) does not use a geometric series, but rather the series for e. Weierstrass uses a
geometric series as discussed above. This seems to be an improvement over the original
proof! Namely, using the series for e causes two problems: first, it is necessary to factor
out the first term q!/(q + 1)! = 1/(q + 1), and nothing in the program will cause that
to happen; and it seems that only an ad hoc rule could force it to happen. Second, and
more important, the estimate that comes out is e/(q+1), and it is not even true that this
is bounded by one for all q. Instead, one has to separately prove e < 3 and introduce a
case split, treating the cases q = 1 and q = 2 separately. All this is left implicit in Siegel
(1949), but nothing in Weierstrass would be able to make this case split. In other words,
if we added the series for e to the comparison test inference rule to be tried before the
geometric series, and also forced it to factor out the first term following Siegel (1949), it
would fail to prove e/(q + 1) < 1 and hence fail to find the estimate in Siegel (1949).
Not to worry: the geometric series estimate does succeed. The geometric comparison
series with ratio two and first term (when n = q + 1) matching that of α has general
term 2−n+q+1/(q + 1). This generates the subgoal
q + 1 ≤ n⇒ q!
n!
≤ 2
−n+q+1
q + 1
.
After simplification this inequality becomes
2n−q−1(q + 1)! ≤ n!.
The prover then proves this by induction. Since the assumption q + 1 ≤ n is in the
antecedent, the induction variable is selected as n, and the basis case is n = q + 1. The
basis case then simplifies to true. The induction step yields to the “transitivecancel”
rule discussed above. Namely, the induction step’s goal is
2n+1−q−1(q + 1)! ≤ (n+ 1)!.
Regarding this as the C ≤ D in the conclusion of the transitivecancel rule, and the
induction hypothesis as the A ≤ B term in that rule, we have C/A = v = 2. The new goal
(generated by the transitivecancel rule) is 2n! ≤ (n + 1)!, which reduces using factorial
simplification to 2 ≤ n+ 1, hence to 1 ≤ n, which follows immediately from q + 1 ≤ n.
Since we want to use the comparison test to establish a strict inequality, we must also
verify that strict inequality holds in the comparison for at least one term; Weierstrass
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chooses the second term, where n = q + 2, and the inequality to be proved is
q!
(q + 2)!
<
2−(q+2)+q+1
q + 1
which simplifies to true, completing the comparison test. Note that factorial simplifica-
tion, not just polynomial algebra, is needed here.
This completes the verification of the hypotheses of the Zbound rule. At this point the
metavariable C is unified with min(α, 1 − α), and the prover moves on to the last goal,
namely 0 < C. Originally I had added the inference rule
X < A X < B
X < min(A,B)
.
But this turned out to be superfluous since Mathpert already simplifies X < min(A,B)
to X < A∧X < B. Here is another case where the line between calculation and inference
is blurred.
The final interesting point is that we have already verified both of these goals. Yet
originally, there was nothing in Weierstrass to enable it to re-use those deductions. It
would simply repeat them! The general problem here is, how do we recognize a lemma
when we see one? What subproofs should be accorded the status of lemmas, and recorded,
and referred to when the same goal comes up again later? For the present, Weierstrass
accords that status to the hypotheses of the Zbound rule, on the grounds that almost
always we will be wanting to prove that the bound produced is positive. The prover keeps
a list of lemmas; it records sequents in this list on command, and the first thing it does
when trying to prove a goal is to compare the goal to the list of lemmas. At present,
only the subgoals generated by the Zbound rule are recorded as lemmas. This mechanism
permits the proof to complete in a few lines after the Zbound rule inference completes,
rather than nearly doubling its length.
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Appendix A. Verbatim Copy of the Output
Weierstrass produces an internal proof object, which can be viewed and saved in either
“trace view” or “proof tree view”. There is an option to save the trace view as a TEX
file. Here is the trace-view file, as produced and typeset by Weierstrass:
The goal is
∀p : N, ∀q : N, ∃C,
(
0 < q →
∣∣∣∣e− pq
∣∣∣∣ ≥ Cq! , 0 < C
)
Trying
∀q : N, ∃C,
(
0 < q →
∣∣∣∣e− pq
∣∣∣∣ ≥ Cq! , 0 < C
)
Trying
∃C,
(
0 < q →
∣∣∣∣e− pq
∣∣∣∣ ≥ Cq! , 0 < C
)
Trying
0 < q →
∣∣∣∣e−pq
∣∣∣∣ ≥ min
(∑∞
k=q+1
q!
k! , 1−
∑∞
k=q+1
q!
k!
)
q!
, 0 < min
( ∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
, 1−
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
)
Assuming 0 < q
Trying∣∣∣∣e− pq
∣∣∣∣ ≥ min
(∑∞
k=q+1
q!
k! , 1−
∑∞
k=q+1
q!
k!
)
q!
, 0 < min
( ∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
, 1−
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
)
Trying ∣∣∣∣e− pq
∣∣∣∣ ≥ min
(∑∞
k=q+1
q!
k! , 1−
∑∞
k=q+1
q!
k!
)
q!
Simplifying, it would suffice to prove
min
( ∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
, 1−
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
)
≤
∣∣∣∣e− pq
∣∣∣∣q!
Since 0 ≤ q!
it would suffice to prove
min
( ∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
, 1−
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
)
≤
∣∣∣∣(e− pq
)
q!
∣∣∣∣
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By the distributive law
it would suffice to prove
min
( ∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
, 1−
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
)
≤
∣∣∣∣eq!− pq!q
∣∣∣∣
Using
pq!
q
= p(q − 1)!
it would suffice to prove
min
( ∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
, 1−
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
)
≤ |eq!− p(q − 1)!|
Using the series definition of e
it would suffice to prove
min
( ∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
, 1−
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
)
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
( ∞∑
k=0
1
k!
)
q!− p(q − 1)!
∣∣∣∣∣
Simplifying, it would suffice to prove
min
( ∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
, 1−
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
)
≤
∣∣∣∣∣q!
∞∑
k=0
1
k!
− p(q − 1)!
∣∣∣∣∣
Pushing a constant into the infinite series,
it would suffice to prove
min
( ∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
, 1−
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
)
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
k=0
q!
k!
− p(q − 1)!
∣∣∣∣∣
Since
k ≤ q → q!
k!
: Z
we can separate the initial integer-valued terms;
it would suffice to prove
min
( ∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
, 1−
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
)
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
q∑
k=0
q!
k!
+
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
− p(q − 1)!
∣∣∣∣∣
Simplifying, it would suffice to prove
min
( ∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
, 1−
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
)
≤
∣∣∣∣∣−p(q − 1)! +
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
+
q∑
k=0
q!
k!
∣∣∣∣∣
Since
−p(q − 1)! +
q∑
k=0
q!
k!
is an integer
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it suffices to prove
0 <
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
and
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
< 1
Trying
0 <
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
It would suffice to prove the general term is positive.
Trying
∀k,
(
q + 1 ≤ k → 0 < q!
k!
)
Trying
q + 1 ≤ k → 0 < q!
k!
Assuming q + 1 ≤ k
Trying
0 <
q!
k!
Hey, that simplifies to true!
Success
Discharging
Success
Success
Success
Success: that completes the proof of
0 <
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
Recording this result as Lemma 1
Trying
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
< 1
Try comparison with an easier series.
Trying
∀k : Z,
(
q + 1 ≤ k →
∣∣∣∣ q!k!
∣∣∣∣ ≤ q!(q + 1)!
(
1
2
)k−q−1)
Trying
q + 1 ≤ k →
∣∣∣∣ q!k!
∣∣∣∣ ≤ q!(q + 1)!
(
1
2
)k−q−1
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Assuming q + 1 ≤ k
Trying ∣∣∣∣ q!k!
∣∣∣∣ ≤ q!(q + 1)!
(
1
2
)k−q−1
Simplifying, it would suffice to prove
2k−q−1(q + 1)! ≤ k!
Trying mathematical induction on k
The basis case is when k = q + 1
Hey, that simplifies to true!
That completes the basis case.
Now for the induction step.
Assume the induction hypothesis
2k−q−1(q + 1)! ≤ k!
We must prove
2k+1−q−1(q + 1)! ≤ (k + 1)!
Simplifying, it would suffice to prove
2k−q(q + 1)! ≤ (k + 1)!
In view of
2k−q(q + 1)! = 2k−q−1(q + 1)!2
and the assumption
2k−q−1(q + 1)! ≤ k!
it would suffice to prove 2k! ≤ (k + 1)!
Hey, that simplifies to true!
Success
That completes the induction step.
Induction completed successfully.
Success
Discharging
Success
Success
Trying
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
(q + 1)!
(
1
2
)k−q−1
≤ 1
Summing the geometric series,
it would suffice to prove
q!
(q+1)!
(
1
2
)q+1−q−1
1− 12
≤ 1
Hey, that simplifies to true!
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Success
We must prove strict inequality for at least one term.
We try the term with k = q + 1 + 1
Trying∣∣∣∣ q!(q + 1 + 1)!
∣∣∣∣ < q!(q + 1)!
(
1
2
)q+1+1−q−1
Hey, that simplifies to true!
Success of comparison test
Success: that completes the proof of
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
< 1
Recording this result as Lemma 2
Success
Success
Trying
0 < min
( ∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
, 1−
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
)
Simplifying, it would suffice to prove
0 <
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
, 0 < 1−
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
Trying
0 <
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
This has been proved in Lemma 1
Success
Trying
0 < 1−
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
Simplifying, it would suffice to prove
∞∑
k=q+1
q!
k!
< 1
This has been proved in Lemma 2
Success
Success
Success
Discharging
Success
Success
Success
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Success. That completes the proof.
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